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CONCLUSION
The new Ohio law has brought the landlord-tenant relationship into
the twentieth century. The nature of the relationship is now governed by
statute instead of common law. By creating rights and duties for both the
landlord and tenant, the legislature has established a policy of promoting
fit and decent housing. The purpose of this article has not been to
criticize this new legislation, but to point out to the court and to the
practitioner the possible interpretations of the new Act.3
ROBERT J. CROYLE
FOUR YEARS OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENTS: A REVIEW OF AGENCY
ADMINISTRATION OF NEPA
INTRODUCTION
T HE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, through its presence in almost every phase
of the nation's activity, is shaping the character of the future. This is
perhaps nowhere more true than in the field of environmental concerns
where choices about uses of our physical resources are frequently
irrevocable. Recognizing this, Congress set out to impose on the federal
government a course of "preventive and anticipatory"' decision making
with respect to the environment. This effort took the form of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (hereinafter NEPA or
the Act). 2 The Act officially declares environmental quality to be a
national priority and lists as goals for the nation to:3
(1) Fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations;
(2) Assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and
esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) Attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable
and unintended consequences;
215 The last section of the new act preempts municipal ordinances which conflict or
regulate the relationship between landlord and tenant. See OHiO REV. CODE ANN. §
5321.19 (Baldwin Supp. 1974). For a somewhat analogous situation, see the State's
regulation of trailer parks. OmHo REv. CODE ANN. § 3733.02 (Page 1974); Noland
v. Sharonville, 4 Ohio App. 2d 7, 211 N.E.2d 90 (1964).
1 115 CoNo. Rac. 40416 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson).
2 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970) [here-
inafter cited as NEPA].
3 NEPA § 4331 (b).
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(4) Preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our
national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environ-
ment which supports diversity, and variety of individual choice;
(5) Achieve a balance between population and resource use which
will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's
amenities; and
(6) Enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
These goals may reveal a naive optimism but, as has become clear,
4
they do not represent the heart of the bill. The policy of the Act is to
make the environment a legitimate and necessary concern of all
government officials. No agency of the federal government is to undertake
any major action without first understanding the implications of the action
for the surrounding physical environment.
Underlying the Act is also the recognition that major public works
often proceed at cross purposes and without reference to the wishes of
the people who are most affected by them. 5 Thus, it requires, at least
insofar as there are environmental values at stake, that agency decision
making open itself to input from other federal agencies, from state and
local governmental units, and from the public.
6
NEPA is not simply the statement of a philosophy or an empty
exhortation. Section 4332(2)(c) of the Act is an "action forcing"
provision,7 imposing on all agencies of the federal government the duty to
include an Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter EIS) in all
recommendations for "major federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment." The impact report must be a detailed
statement discussing unavoidable adverse environmental effects, alternative
courses of action, the relationship between the short-term use of the
environment and long-term productivity and, finally, any irretrievable
commitments of resources. 8 There are no specific sanctions for failure to
4 See notes 114-25 and accompanying text, infra, for discussion of procedural versus
substantive rights under NEPA.
NEPA is not an "environmental bill of rights." Environmental Defense Fund v.
Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971). [hereinafter cited as EDF v.
Corps]. In the original, S. 1075, § 101(C) spoke of a "fundamental right" to a
healthful environment. Members of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs voted to excise the phrase from the final version. 115 CoNo. REc. 40,416
(1969). See also Klipsch, Aspects of a Constitutional Right to a Habitable Environ-
ment: Towards an Environmental Due Process, 49 INDIANA L.J. 203 (1974).
5 SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT].
6 NEPA § 4332(2) (C).
7 NEPA was modeled after the Employment Act of 1946 which was concerned with
the responsibility of the federal government to act to avoid economic dislocations.
However, the action-forcing provisions of § 4332(2) (C) have no direct legislative
model in their application to all federal actions rather than those of a particular
agency. 2 CEQ ANN. REP. 222-23 (1970).
8 NEPA § 4332(2) (C)."
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comply with the EIS requirement. The drafters appear to have assumed
that the Act would be self-enforcing.
This article will focus on the environmental impact statement process
of NEPA functions. It will analyze some of the structural weaknesses of
the process, some of the interests private parties are using it to protect
and, finally, whether or not it is bringing us closer to a realization of
the lofty goals the Act sets forth in Section 4331.
THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrrY
NEPA creates in the Executive Office of the President, the Council
on Environmental Quality (hereinafter the Council or CEQ). 9 The
Council is to serve primarily as an environmental clearinghouse, gathering
and disseminating data and making recommendations for national
environmental legislation.'0 The statute gives CEQ no specific authority to
enforce its policies and, up to now, it has exercised none directly." CEQ
nevertheless plays an important part in the EIS process. Executive Order
No. 1151412 authorized CEQ to issue guidelines for the implementation of
the provisions of Section 4332(2).13 These Guidelines,' 4 coupled with
expansive interpretations of NEPA by the courts, have created a major
evaluation step in almost all administrative decision making. Pursuant
to the Guidelines, agencies must follow an elaborate procedure for at
least giving formal recognition to potential ecological effects of their
actions. CEQ Guidelines are not binding on agencies and on occasion
courts have invalidated them as not sufficiently stringent.as But as a
rule, both administrative bodies and the judiciary rely on them for
guidance as to NEPA compliance.
In Greene County Planning Board v. FPC,16 rejecting the FPC's
argument as to when an EIS had to be filed, Judge Kaufman commented:
9 NEPA § 4342.
10 NEPA § 4344.
11 But see Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 378 F. Supp. 240 (9th Cir.
1974), af'd, 417 U.S. 1301 (1974) for a possible developing trend. Justice Douglas,
sitting as Circuit Justice for the 9th Circuit, granted a stay of a district court order
allowing dam construction to proceed, on the strength of a letter from the CEQ
which expressed the opinion that the impact statement prepared was inadequate. This
was later affirmed by the whole Court.
12 Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 902 (1970).
iS Prior to the issuance of the Order, it may have been thought that § 4332(2) (C)
would be self-effectuating "despite its vague terms and lack of clear procedure..."
Comment, The Council on Environmental Quality's Guidelines and Their Influence
on the National Environmental Policy Act, 23 CATs!. U.L. REv. 547, 550 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Comment]. The legislative history of the Act does not address
the issue of implementation.
14 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.01-.14 (1974).
15 See Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th
Cir. 1971); Ely v. Velde, 497 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1974); Calvert Cliffs Coordinating
Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
16 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972).
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Although the Guidelines are merely advisory and the Council on
Environmental Quality has no authority to prescribe regulations
governing compliance with NEPA, we would not lightly suggest that
the Council, entrusted with the responsibility of developing and
recommending national policies "to foster and promote the improve-
ment of the environmental quality," NEPA Section 204, 42 U.S.C.A.
Section 4344, has misconstrued NEPA. 1
7
NEPA has provoked an extraordinary amount of litigation. In the
four years since its passage, there have been over 500 lawsuits based on
the Act.'8 CEQ monitors the judicial development closely and attempts
to incorporate new interpretations into its Guidelines. In Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission,9 the Court held
that, at every important stage in decision making, there must be an explicit
balancing of environmental values against the commonly used economic
values. This holding became a "recommendation" in a memorandum by
CEQ to all federal agencies, 2° and it is now included in the revised CEQ
Guidelines.2' One author suggests that where there are conflicting holdings
by the courts, as frequently there are, CEQ adopts the most expansive
interpretation as its policy. 22 Because of judicial deference to the Guide-
lines, "[t]he process resembles a feedback loop whereby a new position
taken by CEQ induces a corresponding change in the court decisions which
in turn produces a further change in CEQ interpretation of NEPA."23
In addition to authorizing the establishment of Guidelines of general
applicability, Executive Order 11514 requires that each agency develop its
own formal environmental clearance procedures designed to fulfill the
mandates of NEPA.2 4 Calvert Cliffs represented a direct challenge to
the Atomic Energy Commission's rules for NEPA compliance. Judge
Wright agreed with the plaintiffs, inter alia, that regulations which
permitted the AEC Safety and Licensing Board to decline to review
environmental issues at the hearing level unless they were specifically
raised, and which prevented consideration of "backfitting" of technological
innovations to nuclear plants under construction, were fatally defective.
The case was remanded for further rulemaking. Despite the very vague
17 Id. at 421.
18 Yarrington, Judicial Review of Substantive Agency Decisions: A Second Generation
of Cases Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 19 So. DAK. L. REV. 279
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Yarrington].
19 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Calvert Cliffs v. AEC].
2o CEQ Memo to Federal Agencies on Procedures for Improving Impact Statements,
3 BNA ENV'T Rym. 82 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CEQ Memo].
21 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8 (a) (4) (1974).
= Comment, supra note 13, at 566.
23 Comment, supra note 13, at 571.
24 Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 902 (1970). See also 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3(a). For
examples of individual agency regulations for NEPA compliance, see General Services
Administration, 36 Fed. Re& 23702 (1971); Department of Transportation, 38 Fed.
Reg. 31935 (1973).
[Vol. 8:3
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 3, Art. 12
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol8/iss3/12
language of the statute, and the relatively undeveloped state of the
CEQ Guidelines at that time, 5 the Court relied on the expression in
Section 4332, "to the fullest extent possible," to find that NEPA bound
agencies to strict procedural standards.28
The CEQ assists agencies on an individual basis in preparing their
own rules for implementing NEPA,27 but the official CEQ Guidelines are
the primary model, and agency regulations tend to follow it very closely.
28
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT PROCESS
In evaluating NEPA compliance, courts focus both on the adequacy
of the information flow that occurred during the preparation of the
impact statement, a process-oriented inquiry, and the sufficiency of
the statement itself, a content-oriented inquiry. For achieving the purposes
of the Act, both are equally important. This section of the paper will
examine the information flow process.
Briefly, the CEQ Guidelines set out four distinct stages of
environmental assessment for every major project: early notice, draft
statement, comment period and final impact statement. Theoretically,
only when all of these are completed can an agency review the proposal
and make a determination whether to go forward.
2 9
Early Notice. Th e "early notice" system informs the public of the
decision to prepare an impact statement as soon as the agency makes
it.30 It is much more likely that intervention at this stage will help to shape
the final project than intervention which comes when a dam is two-thirds
complete,3 ' or a nuclear power plant is constructed and ready to begin
operation. 32 Yet regardless of this timely opportunity to participate, courts
are unwilling to invoke the doctrine of laches to dismiss an action which is
brought well after the date of final project approval. 3 It may be that courts
25See 40 C.F.R. § 1500 et seq. (1970).
26449 F.2d at 1115.
27 4 CEQ ANN. REP. 246 (1973).
28 Compare the description of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
Interim Regulations for preparing EIS's in Duckworth, HUD Explains Its Environ-
mental Clearance Procedures, 34 MORTGAGE BANKER 42 (1974) with the CEQ
Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.01-.14 (1974).
29 Because the Act has some retroactive effect and is applicable to many ongoing
projects, agencies may modify the sequence in certain cases. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.13
(1974).
3040 C.F.R. § 1500.6(e) (1974).
31 See EDF v. Corps, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
3 2 See generally Murphy, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Licensing
Process: Environmentalist Magna Carta or Agency Coup de Grace? 72 COLUM. L.
RExV. 963 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Murphy].
33 See Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 332 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Va.
1971), rev'd, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972); City of New York v. United States, 344
F. Supp. 929 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See also BNA ENV'T RPmR., Monograph No. 17, at
15-16 (1974), for a survey of the doctrine of laches in NEPA cases.
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recognize that publication in the Federal Register, the means of early
notice the Guidelines suggests, is unlikely to give actual notice to members
of the general public, however great their interest.
Ideally, the interagency, interdisciplinary approach urged by the Act
should begin with the earliest planning stages of a project.34 The Office of
Management and Budget Circular A-95 allows local, regional and state
governmental agencies to review and comment upon many proposed
applications for federal assistance. Use of this for environmental objectives
could make the early notice system an effective means for soliciting
local viewpoints at a meaningful time.35 However, it has experienced
only limited success even in its application to general non-environmental
planning problems.38
Draft Statement. CEQ suggests that an agency make an effort to
discover and discuss at the draft stage all major points of view with respect
to an action under consideration.37 "The draft statement must fulfill and
satisfy to the fullest extent possible at the time the draft is prepared the
requirements established for final statements by Section 4332(2) (C)."38
This requires consultation with federal agencies who have particular
expertise in the relevant subject matter, other specialists, local govern-
mental units which will be affected, pro-environmental organizations
and citizens who have expressed an interest in the project.39 When the
draft is complete, the preparing agency has an affirmative duty to
circulate the document and to solicit comments from those same groups
and from any others who have announced their concern or who may
have a contribution to make.4
Comment Process. The comment period lasts from 30 to 60 days
even though the agency members may have spent years compiling the
draft. It may include a public hearing. There are frequently general
statutory requirements for hearings, and where that is the case, the hearing
must address itself to environmental as well as non-environmental
concerns. Participants should be given the opportunity to cross-examine
agency officials and applicants for the federal assistance on the basis of the
draft EIS.41 If there is no general provision for a hearing, the agency
3440 C.F.R. § 1500.8(c) (1974).
5 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (1974).
3OMB Circular A-95: A Neglected Environmental Assessment Tool Provides an
Early Pressure Point, 4 ENV'T L. RPT. 50043, 50044 (1974).
37 CEQ Memo, supra note 20.
3840 C.F.R. § 1500.7(a) (1974).
39The recommendation that comments be solicited from environmentalist groups
marks a major stride forward from Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1970),
where the issue was whether such a group could show a sufficient interest to support
a claim of standing.
4040 C.F.R. § 1500.9 (1974).
41 Greene County Planning Bd. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412, 423 (2d. Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Greene County v. FPC].
550 [Vol. 8:3
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should make an independent determination as to whether environmental
issues warrant a hearing. Relevant considerations are: the size of the
project, the level of public interest, the likelihood that members of
the public will be able to make significant contributions at a hearing, the
extent to which the public has already had an opportunity to participate.42
Although any administrative agency within the federal government
can be called upon 4" to comment on another agency's draft statement, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is required to by law whenever
a proposal may have an impact on an area within its scope of authority.44
In practice, the EPA comments on virtually all EIS's. 45 It does not have
a veto power over agency projects on which it comments but, if EPA
finds a proposed action unsatisfactory from an environmental standpoint
or determines that an EIS is so inadequate that meaningful comment is
not possible, it must report its findings to the CEQ and to the public.4
A few other agencies, because of their particular fields of expertise,
are asked to comment on large numbers of the draft statements. The
Department of Interior, for example, reviews hundreds of proposed
actions affecting land use and fish and wildlife values.47 Although CEQ is
the overseer of NEPA, it has only a minor role in the comment process.
Agencies must file copies of every EIS with the Council. CEQ selects a
very small number of statements for actual review and its purpose is to
discover structural weaknesses in the preparation process and promulgate
improved Guidelines to deal with those weaknesses. CEQ comments
directly only on particularly troublesome or controversial projects. 48
Final Impact Statement. All written comments submitted to the
principal agency become part of the final environmental impact statement
(FES) and, to the extent that the draft does not adequately address issues
raised in the comments, the agency must review and modify the state-
ment.49 Frequently dispute in litigation centers around whether an agency
sufficiently answered in the final EIS objections raised by commenting
parties.50 After the agency completes the final report and distributes it to
those who participated in the comment process, it must wait 30 days
before action on an approved project begins. This allows a period for
final review. If, after submitting comments on the FES, there is a
4240 C.F.R. § 1500.7(d) (4) (1974).
43 CEQ ANNa. REP. 237 (1972).
4 4 Among the statutes which provide for EPA to comment on draft ElSes are the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1955), and the Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4901 etseq. (1972).
45 BNA ENV'T RPTR., Monograph No. 17, at 10 (1974).
48 40 C.F.R. § 1500.9(b) (1974).
47 40 C.F.R. § 1500.9 (1974).
4Id.
4940 C.F.R. § 1500.10(a) (1974).
50 E.g., Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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discovery of significant new information or a judicial order necessitates
further modifications, CEQ generally will not require recirculation of
the impact study.51 Unless an agency is refusing to file an EIS, judicial
inquiry into NEPA compliance must await the agency's final determination
to proceed with the project in question.5
The foregoing discussion has assumed that an environmental impact
statement is required. Frequently, this is the issue in dispute. NEPA
applies to "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment." 5 3 That phrase has resolved itself into four
distinct threshold questions: Is the project a major action? Is it federal
in nature? Will it have a significant effect? Does it involve the quality
of the human environment?
If an agency decides that the answer to all of these is negative, it
need not prepare an impact statement. However, to ensure that appropriate
consideration is given to the policies of NEPA and to provide a reviewable
record should anyone challenge the preliminary determination, courts
have required a formal "negative declaration" stating the reasons why
the agency is not undertaking an environmental study.5 4 It is unlikely that
such a step was foreseen by the drafters of NEPA. But in their attempt to
force compliance "to the fullest extent possible," judges have found
support for it in Section 4332(b), 5 which directs agencies to: "Identify
and develop methods and procedures, . . . which will insure that
presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be
given appropriate consideration in decision making along with economic
and technical considerations."
To allow meaningful review, the negative declaration must be detailed
and specific to the peculiar demands of the use and site under
consideration. It is, in effect, a scaled-down EIS. In Hanly v. Mitchell,
5 6
the General Services Administration (GSA) decided that an EIS was not
required for a Metropolitan Correction Center in lower Manhattan.
GSA's negative impact statement discussed plans for heat, water, and
garbage and sewage disposal. The court held that the document was
inadequate and remanded the case to GSA twice to consider, inter alia,
the impact of a prison on the families who lived in the neighborhood, the
likelihood of riots and disturbances, the possibility of increased crime and
drug availability, and the parking arrangements for visitors. The court's
R 3 CEQ ANN. RaP. 238-39 (1972).
52 Greene County v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 423 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
849 (1972).
53 NEPA § 4332(2) (C).
54 E.g., Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AFC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1094
(D.C. Cir. 1973) [hereinafter cited as SIPI v. AEC].
55 See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 835 (2d Cir. 1972).
56 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
[Vol. 8:3
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rulings were not that an EIS was necessary,5 7 but only that prior to
making a threshold determination, GSA had to consider a broad range
of relevant factors and had to give the public an opportunity to submit
information which might bear on the agency's decision.
Where it is conceded that an action is a "major federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment," one of
several limited exceptions may operate to exclude it from the scope
of NEPA. Courts exempt actions where there is a valid claim of national
security, emergency or legislative stipulation.
In a rapid series of decisions during the eleventh hour controversy
over nuclear testing near Amchitka Island, Alaska,58 the Fifth Circuit
ruled that the impact statement prepared by the AEC was deficient, that
presidential approval does not negate an agency's obligation to comply
with NEPA and that executive privilege would not be recognized to
prevent discovery of the documents used to prepare the EIS. But when
faced with the final request to enjoin the blast, the court refused..
Although the AEC had not met its duties under NEPA, the court
acceded to the important interests of national security urged by the
government. The Supreme Court affirmed.59
During the recent Middle East oil embargo, the Federal Energy
Office (FEO), with congressional authorization, imposed regulations
governing the allocation of crude oil among refiners. Gulf Oil Company
argued that the allocation scheme was invalid because FEO inaugurated it
without preparing an EIS. The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals
held that in circumstances such as critical oil shortage the need for
immediate action takes precedence over NEPA.60 The "emergency" excep-
tion also applies to temporary actions such as an interim rate increase.6 '
If the legislature explicitly so stipulates, an agency action may be
excused from the requirements of NEPA. Administrative officials often
argue that when Congress approves appropriations bills for individual
projects or programs, it is tacitly agreeing that the action is consistent
with the policies of NEPA. Courts reject this theory of "repeal by
implication." In the Gillham Dam case, Judge Eisele responded to that
argument by saying: "It is more reasonable to assume that the Congress
in making annual appropriations for such projects, assumes that the
57 The Second Circuit later ruled that the negative impact statement was adequate, and
that construction could proceed without the preparation of a full EIS. Hanly v.
Kleindienst, 484 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973).
58 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 463 F.2d 788,
463 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1971).
59 404 U.S. 917 (1971).
6OGulf Oil v. Simon, 502 F.2d 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Accord, Cohen v. Price
Comm'n, 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
6
1See Port of New York Authority v. ICC, 451 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1971).
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responsible agencies are complying with all applicable laws."2
On the other hand, where congressional intent is clear, "even severely
circumscribed judicial review is both inapposite and unnecessary." ' In
the Alaska Pipeline case,64 NEPA claims were rendered moot by a statute
which specified that the six-volume EIS prepared by the Department of
the Interior shall be deemed sufficient under NEPA.65
A fourth and very different kind of exception66 to NEPA applica-
bility, is federal revenue sharing.6 7 One justification offered for the
exemption is the absence of sufficient "federal action." This is not entirely
persuasive. The Office of Revenue Sharing retains full veto power over
proposals; it supplies, restricts and oversees the allocation of funds and it
conducts periodic audits and investigations.68 Some authors69 suggest that
Ely v. Velde,70 which held that NEPA applies to a block grant program of
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, lends support to the
application of NEPA to revenue sharing. The court in Ely distinguished
the two: "A block grant is not the same as unencumbered revenue sharing,
for the grant comes with strings attached. The state voluntarily requested
federal participation in the center and in this manner obtained construction
funds conditioned upon compliance with NEPA..." r While this distinction
is not compelling, it seems likely that courts will continue to accept the
exemption out of respect for the "no strings" philosophy of unrestricted
grants. And if states continue at the current rate to pass their own NEPA's,
the exception will have minimal impact on the policy of the Act.72 Courts
have carefully limited all of these exceptions and they probably do not rep-
resent a significant retreat from the standard of fullest possible compliance.
62See SIPI v. ABC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Committee for Nuclear Respon-
sibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1971); EDF v. Corps, 325 F. Supp. 749
(E.D. Ark. 1971).
63EDF v. Corps, 492 F.2d 1123, 1141 (5th Cir. 1974).
6Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970), affd sub nom.
Wilderness Society v. Morton, 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd, 479 F.2d 822
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
65Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1651 et seq. (1973).
60 Another exception to note only in passing applies to the District of Columbia.
Because of the special status of Washington, certain activities may require federal
approval. However, they are, by nature, municipal activities and the EIS requirements
are waived. See Tolman Laundry v. Washington, 6 ERC 1264 (D.C. Super. 1974).
67 40 C.F.R. § 1500.5(a) (2) (1974).
6 See State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1221 et seq. (1972). See
generally Note, The Application of Federal Environmental Standards to the General
Revenue Sharing Program: NEPA and Unrestricted Federal Grants, 60 VA. L. REv.
114 (1974).
69F. ANDERsoN, NEPA iN ma CoUaTs 60-61 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON].
70 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
71497 F.2d at 256.
72 See 4 CEQ ANN. REP. 248 (1973). The CEQ notes that 15 states and the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico have enacted their own versions of NEPA.
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PROGRAM IMPACT STATEMENTS
The impact statement process applies to every "recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions .... -73
However, the impact statement process outlined above is best suited to
evaluating individual actions which frequently are part of, and assume the
value of, much larger programs. In that context, the principal agency
or applicant for federal assistance tentatively selects the course of action
and a site. Environmental analysts can then isolate the particular kinds
of effects the action will generate in the particular location. The need for
speculation is diminished and citizen participation is maximized. Agency
officials can easily identify the segment of the public whose input they
should seek and, because of the immediacy of the threat or benefit of the
proposed action, there is more likely to be a high level of public interest.
If an agency delays environmental evaluation until it has before it
an application for an offshore oil lease or a funding request for the final
segment of a highway, it defeats the policy of NEPA to choose courses
of action that are least detrimental to the natural environment. By that
point, the agency has made the major program decisions and only
minor adjustments in the plans of the particular project 'are possible.
Whether consciously or through oversight, the agency has avoided
serious consideration of alternative approaches. To remedy this, there
has been some progress toward program impact studies whereby an
agency begins environmental evaluations at the earliest possible stages.
Calvert Cliffs invalidated the Atomic Energy Commission's regula-
tions for implementation of NEPA because they postponed consideration
of certain crucial environmental issues with respect to nuclear power
plants from the construction permit stage to the operating license
proceedings. Judge Wright noted that:
Compliance to the fullest extent possible would seem to demand that
environmental issues be considered at every important stage in the
decision making concerning a particular action-at every stage
where an overall balancing of environmental and nonenvironmental
factors is appropriate and where alterations might be made in the
proposed action to minimize environmental costs.
74
Two years later, Judge Wright recognized that, for effective
balancing of environmental factors, impact studies may be required
at the research stage, long before the agency considers an application
for a particular action.
To wait until a technology attains the stage of commercial feasibility
before considering the possible adverse environmental effects attend-
ant upon ultimate application of the technology will undoubtedly
73 NEPA § 4332(2) (C).
74449 F.2d at 1118.
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frustrate meaningful consideration and balancing of environmental
costs against economic and other benefits.-"
The Court was unconvinced by the AEC's position that the liquid metal
fast breeder reactor program that the plaintiffs were challenging was in
such incipient stages that any EIS would be purely speculative. To support
its request for funding, the Commission had prepared an elaborate cost-
benefit analysis involving projections for the development of the technology
and the Nation's energy needs through and beyond the year 2000. The
analysis notably lacked any discussion of ecological dangers.
The Court set out several criteria by which agencies should judge
when an EIS is required: 76
1. Does the agency know enough about the program to make an
evaluation meaningful?
2. Is the agency restricting consideration of other alternatives
because of the development of this program?
3. Is the agency making any irretrievable commitments of resources,
financial or otherwise?
4. How significant are the anticipated effects of the overall program?
The CEQ Guidelines now require that an agency establish a formal
procedure for deciding what acts necessitate an environmental evaluation
of a given program.77 When an agency concludes that -an EIS is not
yet necessary but will be at a later date, it must file a "negative
declaration" stating the reasons for its determination.78
The problem of timely evaluation is not limited to the field of research
and development. If the federal government is considering a major
highway building program or strip mining legislation, some NEPA studies
should begin at that time to decide whether those answers to transportation
or energy needs are consistent with environmental values and whether the
agency can structure the program in ways that will minimize adverse effects.
If the agency or Congress authorizes the broad policy objectives with
full knowledge of the general kinds of impacts the program will have, later
individual project statements need not reexamine those issues. 79 At each
successive stage in the decision making, the EIS should focus increasingly
on impacts which the program statement did not anticipate a° or which are
peculiar to the individual project in question. This "tiering" of impact
statements is a step toward compliance with NEPA's mandate to "Study,
75SIPI v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1074, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
76 Id. at 1094-98.
7740 C.F.R. § 1500.6(c) (1974).
78 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(d) (2) (1974).
9 Id.
60 $ee Union of Concemie4 Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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develop and describe appropriate alternatives to recommend courses of
action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning
appropriate uses of available resources."1 The primary risk that tiering
introduces into the EIS process is that, at the early stages of evaluation,
some risks may seem too remote to merit attention. Later in the process,
those conducting project evaluations will assume that previous discussion
on those same issues was sufficient. In addition, it is more difficult to
define standards of adequacy for an EIS at the program level.82
Multi-agency actions also may require modifications of NEPA
processes. If several federal agencies contribute to the planning and
execution of a single project, the Council on Environmental Quality
recommends that they conduct a single environmental assessment. 83 This
can be done on a joint basis or through the selection of a "lead"
agency, usually the agency with the greatest overall involvement or the
greatest environmental expertise.84 In either case, all participating agencies
contribute to the final product.8
Frederick Anderson of the Environmental Law Institute criticizes
the composite EIS approach because it excuses an agency from the
obligation to focus directly on the effects of its own activities.84 While
this may be so, the absence of a single study evaluating the cumulative
impacts of a multi-faceted program presents an even greater likelihood
that the policies of NEPA will be thwarted. Separate actions within the
general scheme may not be sufficiently major to require an impact
statement themselves even though the project as a whole will significantly
affect the quality of the human environment. Furthermore, when each
agency prepares its statement alone, no one official is in a position to
make an accurate cost-benefit analysis of the whole program. To ensure
that each agency has adequately balanced environmental concerns with
respect to its actions and that the lead agency has considered the
cumulative effects, CEQ should specially scrutinize multi-agency plans.8 7
81 NEPA § 43 32 (2) (D). See also ANDERSON, supra note 69, at 290-92.
82 SIPI v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1091-92 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
83 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(b) (1974).
84 3 CEQ ANN. REP. 234-36 (1972).
8540 C.F.R. § 1500.7(b) (1974). The paucity of cases in which there are several
defendant agencies may indicate that this is not a widely used practice. But see Upper
Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 328 F. Supp. 332 (D.N.M. 1971), aff'd, 452 F.2d 1233 (10th
Cir. 1971), vacated 409 U.S. 1021 (1972).
86ANDERsoN, supra note 69, at 199-200. Anderson's position is supported by the
reasoning in Calvert Cliffs v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and in Greene
County v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972), which prohibit an agency from relying
on compliance with the environmental regulations of another agency or the impact
studies conducted by the applicant. Both cases hold that the principal agency must
conduct an independent review.
s7 Warm Springs v. Gribble, 378 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1974), suggests that at least in
the litigated cases, a formal expression of opposition by CEQ carries substantial weight.
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Courts,88 the CEQ8 and environmental specialists 9 unanimously
insist that an environmental statement must be more than a "post hoc
rationalization" for a predetermined course of action. Yet that seems to be
inescapably the nature of a project EIS. The EIS is not a general inquiry
into various possible solutions to a given problem. Rather, it is a
justification for the agency's choice. It serves as an advocacy tool. Pursuant
to Section 4332(2)(C)(iii), the impact statement must mention alternative
approaches. Treatment of those is frequently only cursory and the focus
remains on the preferred action.91 As a practical matter, the agency may
be choosing between the main proposal and not acting at all.92 If there is
an urgent need or political pressure, then even inaction is not a real
choice. Environmental impact studies for legislation, research and
development, and broad federal programs offer at least a limited guarantee
that responsible agencies will do some balancing of environmental factors
prior to selecting the lead proposal over other viable alternatives.
The character of the administrative agency system is a further
obstacle to effective consideration of alternatives. Federal agencies have
narrow, usually well-defined fields of responsibility and expertise. To
perpetuate their existence, they must have a major program or industry
to regulate. Each agency has a vested interest in developing and continuing
the programs within the scope of its authority. Addressing an attempt
by the Department of the Interior to execute a lease for offshore drilling,
the court in National Resources Defense Council v. Morton93 held that an
agency must consider all reasonable alternatives, including those outside
what it has the power to adopt.94 If agencies are vying with each other for
influence, they are likely to evade this obligation whenever possible. But
willingness to comply is only one part of the problem. One agency
may be unaware of alternate approaches that other agencies could
pursue.95 More likely, they will lack the information they would need
to balance the costs and benefits of the solutions that are not within its
competence against the known consequences of its own proposal. As was
noted above, a situation may demand immediate action and, if the
s8 See Greene County v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 424-25 (2d Cir. 1972). See also SIPI
v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
89 4 CEQ ANN. REP. 234 (1973).
90 See EDF v. Corps, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974).
91 For examples where courts remanded cases to the preparing agencies for failure to
treat adequately alternative proposals, see Arlington Coalition on Transportation v.
Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1337 (4th Cir. 1972), and National Resources Defense Council
v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1971), 337 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1971),
motion for summary rev'l denied, 418 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972), dismissed as moot,
337 F. Supp. 170 (D.D.C. 1972).
92 See Murphy, supra note 32, at 980-81.
93 337 F. Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1971).
94It now appears in the CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.H. § 1500.8(a)(4) (1974).
95 The comment phase of the EIS process is imperfectly suited to gathering sufficient
data about the solutions other agencies might pursue.
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principal agency decides that another department can achieve the same
objectives with less detriment to the environment, it has no means to
implement the other plan. It can only decide not to act.
AGENCY ADMINISTRATION op NEPA
Agency resistance to NEPA goes much deeper than the problem of
adequate consideration of alternatives. Federal regulatory agencies are
primarily concerned with economic expansion. Congress sought to impose
on them what it described as an equally important duty to protect the
environment.9 6 But the ecological concerns remain foreign and secondary,
particularly when they appear to be inconsistent with the agencies' broader
mandates. 97 Noncompliance ranges from deliberate concealment of known
serious impacts to simple miscalculation of the magnitudes of effects.
The Atomic Energy Commission is among the most criticized
agencies for its reluctance to comply. In Calvert Cliffs, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia said of the AEC's proposed
regulations: "We believe that the Commission's crabbed interpretation
of NEPA makes a mockery of the Act."198 Later, the same court found
that the AEC could have "no rational basis" 99 for its determination that
it was not yet required to prepare an EIS for a research program which
AEC had funded for more than $200 million. That opinion very nearly
accused the AEC of outright bad faith violations of the law.
Despite these and numerous other lawsuits, 00 it appears that the AEC
continues to hedge and dissemble in order to win approval of its projects.
A recent newspaper report indicates that for the last 10 years the
Commission has purposefully concealed information about the dangers of
nuclear power plants for which it has issued both construction and
operation permits.' 0' Many of the efforts of concealment occurred in
the context of EIS studies. Dr. Glenn Seaborg, former head of the
AEC, said that the agency wished to avoid the public "misunderstanding"
and the adverse reactions the studies might provoke. This suppression
of data is a direct contravention of the policy of the Act which
Judge Eisele described in the Gillham Dam case:
At the very least, NEPA is an environmental full disclosure law. The
Congress, by enacting it, may not have intended to alter the then
96 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 20.
97 See Yarington, supra note 18, at 293. "There exists a natural, in fact, healthy bias
on the part of most action-oriented federal agencies in favor of doing what they were
established to do...."
98 449 F.2d 1109, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
99 SIPI v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
100 See, e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
SIPI v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility
v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1971); Calvert Cliffs v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
1M New York Tunes, November 10, 1975, § 1, at 1, cot 1.
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existing decision making responsibilities or take away any then exist-
ing freedom of decision making, but it certainly intended to make
such decision making more responsive and more responsible.1
It would be less troublesome if we could assume that the AEC is alone in
flouting NEPA goals. However, there is substantial evidence to the contrary.
The Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) investigated
impact statements prepared for highway construction by the Department of
Transportation which is, by a significant margin, the largest single source
of impact studies. 03 Their results show that, although many of the EIS's
are legally insufficient, the Department regularly approves the projects.
Among the findings of CSPI are: 13% of the statements did not mention
air pollution; 34% did not consider community disruption; 54% did not
consider the impact on nearby property values; 86% failed to discuss mass
transit alternatives; 30% denied that there would be any adverse effects.1
4
For several years, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
argued that it was not bound by the procedural restrictions of NEPA.
Courts agreed on the theory that there was "little need in requiring a
NEPA statement from an agency whose raison d'etre is protection of the
environment and whose decision [making] is necessarily infused with
the environmental considerations so pertinent to Congress in designing the
statutory framework."'' 1 In fiscal 1974, Congress earmarked $5 million of
EPA funds for the preparation of impact statements. This persuaded EPA
to conduct environmental studies on a "voluntary basis" for certain of its
major regulatory actions. 1' 6 Following that announcement, Region X
Director John Burd reported that during fiscal 1975, because of limited
resources, EPA would write EIS's for only 5% of its major construction
grant projects under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.107
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) may finally be ready
to accept its duties under NEPA. After four setbacks in court,08 the
ICC is changing its procedures and increasing the number of environ-
102 EDF v. Corps, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
103In 1971, DOT accounted for 66% of all ElSes; in 1972, the figure was 49%; and
through June 30, 1973, DOT was preparing 40% of the total number of statements.
(The downward trend is due in part to increased reliance on program ElSes.) 4 CEQ
ANN. REP. 244-45 (1973).
104 For a summary of the CSPI report, see Morgenthaler, On the Road Again: Certifi-
cation Acceptance Forces NEPA to Adapt, 4 ENv'T L RPTR. 50023, 50026 n. 29
(1974).
105 Internat'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650 n.130 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
See Anaconda Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (10th Cir. 1973); Getty
Oil Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973).
106 1974 BNA ENV'T RPm. "Federal Laws" 21:4001.
107 BNA ENv'T RPTR. "Current Developments" 187.
10s Port of New York Authority v. ICC, 451 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1971); SCRAP v.
United States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972); City of New York v. United States,
344 F. Supp. 929 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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mental assessments it conducts. From 1970 through 1973, the ICC
submitted two impact statements to CEQ. During the first eight months
of 1974, it submitted eight.109
Zabel v. Tabb"0 provides a different perspective on agency use of
NEPA. In Zabel, the Corps of Engineers relied on the Act to justify its
decision not to issue a dredge and fM1 permit. The EIS process and a public
hearing revealed widespread opposition to the plan but the applicants
urged that the Corps could only refuse to proceed for environmental
reasons. This is the only case this writer discovered wherein NEPA
was used as an affirmative defense.
Agencies can also undermine the Act by insufficient impact
evaluation. Failure to analyze secondary impacts such as changes in land
use patterns in the surrounding area or increased traffic a new project will
precipitate is probably the most common form of noncompliance.'-U EPA
recently announced that it is curbing its grants to localities for sewer
mains because the program had been encouraging unsound patterns of
community growth." 2 The program got underway in 1972 and EPA
approved negative impact declarations for several sites. Localities, anxious
to obtain the federal subsidies, began building sewage facilities which, in
some instances, anticipate expectable population increases for the next
2,000 years. Because EPA did not require land use and energy impact
evaluations as part of the grant award process, communities have been
planning for low density, urban fringe development despite the fact that
the cause of energy conservation might be better served by high density,
urban living patterns. EPA obligated itself to more than $3.4 billion in
grants before it discovered this problem. Had the agency prepared a
program EIS before funding individual projects, it might have foreseen
that such infrastructure improvements would induce changes in land
development and it could have regulated award grants to provide for
more desirable patterns.
Administrative decision making remains a low visibility process and,
if an agency seeks to avoid the requirements of NEPA, purposefully or
through negligence, it can do so with impunity for long periods of time.
Judicial intervention tends to come late, frequently after the agency has
made most of the critical determinations. It is not rare that a court-ordered
EIS can do no more than consider ways to minimize the harms of a program
109 Comment, Harlem Valley Transportation Ass'n v. Stafford: One More Decision
Tells the ICC to Stop Dragging Its Feet on NEPA Compliance, 4 ENV'T L. RPR.
10141 (1974).
110 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
LaU See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(a) (3) (ii) (1974). See generally Dunn, Dutton, Wayman,
The Adequacy of Environmental Impact Statements and the Development of State
Laws, 27 SOUTHWEsTERN LJ. 630 (1973).
U12 New York Tumes, Oct. 15, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
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to which the agency is all but irrevocably committed. Thus, agency recalci-
trance stands as the single most potent obstacle to the success of NEPA."
3
PROCEDURAL VS. SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW UNDER NEPA
In spite of the problems of timeliness, judicial review is an integral
part of the operation of NEPA. Courts and commentators are now
wrestling with whether the Act allows substantive as well as procedural
review.? 4 Substantive review permits a plaintiff to ask not only, "Did
the agency go through all the appropriate steps in assessing the
environmental impact of its proposal?" but also, "Is the finished
product, the final EIS, an adequate evaluation?"
The courts that do allow inquiry into substantive issues rely on
the standard for review that the Supreme Court set in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe." 5 The statute in question in Overton Park, the
Federal-Aid Highway Act," 6 has an impact statement requirement similar
to that of NEPA. It provides, in pertinent part,
Any State highway department which submits plans for a Federal-Aid
highway project.., going through any city... shall certify to the
Secretary that it has had a public hearing... and has considered
the economic and social effects of such a location, its impact on the
environment, and its consistency with the goals and objectives of
such urban planning as has been promulgated by the Community."
7
In response to a challenge for noncompliance with that provision,
Justice Marshall said that the reviewing court must determine: whether
the Secretary acted within the scope of his authority, whether his
determination was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion or
otherwise not in accordance with the law, whether the agency failed
to consider all relevant factors in reaching its decision, or if the decision
itself represented a clear error in judgment." 8
Under this "substantial inquiry" test,119 the scope of review is very
narrow. The plaintiff must establish that "the actual balance of costs
and benefits that the agency struck was arbitrary or clearly gave
insufficient weight to environmental values."' 12 If the court so finds, as
it did in Overton Park, it remands to the agency for further decision
making.1 " It does not have the authority to order the abandonment of
11 EDF v. Corps, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
114 EDF v. Corps, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974), provides a recent listing of which
circuits permit substantive review.
"5 401 U.S. 402 (1970).
11623 U.S.C. § 101 etseq. (1958).
17Id. at § 128(a).
118401 U.S. at 416.
119 1974 BNA ENV'T RPrR. 39.
20 Calvert Cliffs v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
nM Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1970).
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a project even if it believes that modification cannot bring the project
into compliance with Section 4331 policies.
Many commentators argue that NEPA's future success rides on the
availability of substantive judicial review. 12 In light of the restricted
review allowed, this position is unwarranted. The subject matter of an
EIS is often very technical, beyond the comprehension of most lawyers
and judges.12 It is quite common for there to be serious, good faith
dispute among experts about the effects of a particular kind of action.124
Finally, the EIS may require a balancing between incomparables such as
housing for the poor and the destruction of aqualife in a nearby river
as a result of the pollution such housing will cause.l 25 Under these
circumstances, it is necessary that an agency have a broad range of
discretion. On the other hand, only the most wide-ranging review would
permit a court to determine whether an agency is in accord with the
policies of NEPA, except in cases of blatant noncompliance. The
complexity of these factors makes it easy for an agency that wishes to
avoid substantive compliance. It can confuse the issues even further by
including extraneous technical data and by bolstering its position with
additional expert opinions. In part, writing an EIS that will survive judicial
scrutiny is an art; agency personnel can be expected to improve with
practice. In summary, the "substantial inquiry" test is too meagre a device
to combat all the varieties of mere pro forma acquiescence to NEPA. But
regardless of the limited scope of review, plaintiffs have seized upon
NEPA and attempted to expand its meaning in all directions.
PLAINTIFFS IN NEPA LITIGATION
A review of the more than 500 suits' 26 that have been filed under
NEPA since its inception suggests that complainants are using it to protect
a much wider range of interests than those for which Congress originally
intended. Plaintiffs in NEPA suits fall into four major categories: national
groups organized for the protection of the environment; private individuals
and neighborhood groups that have banded together to oppose a particular
action because they fear its effect on their property values; businesses
with an identifiable economic interest in the outcome of the litigation, and
state and local governmental units seeking to protect the interests of their
citizens. 27 These categories are, at best, rough generalizations. The
1M See, e.g., Lukey, NEPA's Impact Statement in the Federal Courts: A Case Study
of NRDC v. Morton, 2 ENV'TAL AlAS 807, 811 (1974).
Im Oakes, Environmental Litigation: Current Developments and Suggestions for the
Future, 5 CONN. L. Rlv. 531, 553 (1973).
124 See Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 378 F. Supp. 240, 244 (9th Cir.
1974), aff'd, 417 U.S. 1301 (1974); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,
453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971).
1m5 Greenburg & Hordon, Environmental Impact Statements: Some Annoying Ques-
tions, 40 J. AM. INST. PLAN. 164, 170 (May 1974).
126 102 CEQ MoNiTOR 135 (May 1974).
127 See ANDERSON, supra note 69, Appendix B,
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pairing of plaintiffs and motives may be interchanged in some cases
and, many times, plaintiffs will have mixed motives. Nevertheless, they
do point out a pattern in the litigation.
It is not surprising that large, nationally known conservationist
organizations initiate much of the NEPA litigation. The environmental
impact statement process is calculated to alert such groups, if not the
general public, to projects in which they are likely to take an interest.
The CEQ Guidelines institutionalize the participation of "relevant
conservation commissions."' 12 8 Courts have also helped to ensure a major
role for them by their holdings with respect to standing, attorneys' fees
and, to a lesser degree, burden of proof.
In Sierra Club v. Morton,129 the Supreme Court ruled that a person
seeking review of agency action on environmental grounds must be able
to show some injury to himself or a member of the group he represents.
This was not a substantial -burden but it was lightened even further
by SCRAP v. United States'" which permits standing where the injury
alleged is to the public at large. It now seems unlikely that any court
will deny standing to an environmentalist association.13'
The cost of litigation can pose a significant barrier to the pursuit
of the important public interests embodied in NEPA. To encourage
environmental groups to advance their claims, courts rely on the "private
attorneys general" doctrine to award fees and costs, generally to a
prevailing party. In Wilderness Society v. Morton,13 2 the court awarded
fees even though, strictly speaking, the plaintiffs did not prevail. The
NEPA claims were never finally resolved by the court because of
congressional intervention.rn However, the court recognized that the
plaintiff's lawsuit served "as the catalyst to ensure that the Department
of Interior drafted an impact statement and that the statement was
thorough and complete."3 4
In Wilderness Society, only half the fees were recoverable because
28 U.S.C. Section 2412 prohibits the assessment of fees against the
federal government or any agency thereof unless otherwise specifically
provided. This statutory prohibition will be a complete bar to recovery
where the government is the only defendant. In the instant case, Alyeska,
the permit applicant for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System, had intervened
128 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.9-.10 (1974).
In 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
130412 U.S. 669 (1973).
1M14 CEQ ANN. RPT. 241 (1973.) For a more extensive discussion of standing in NEPA
cases, see ANDERSON, supra note 69, at 26.
132 495 F.2d 1026 (1974).
13 The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1652 (1973), indicates
that the impact statement prepared by the Department of Interior shall be deemed
sufficient under NEPA.
L34 495 F.2d at 1034,
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and actively participated in the litigation as a real party in interest.
The court found that it was fair to assess Alyeska for half of the cost
of the attorneys' fee.
Cases which explicitly address the problem of burden of proof are
few and conflicting. Several decisions have recognized that the agencies
have the "labor, public resources and expertise to make the proper
environmental assessment and to support it by a preponderance of the
evidence."' 135 They have held that the plaintiff asserting environmental
interests need only make a prima facie showing of noncompliance with
NEPA before the burden shifts to the defending agency.- 6
Some argue that the courts have been far too generous in their
treatment of organizations such as the Sierra Club. 37 The result has been
the serious delay of important national programs. In Environmental
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers,1s8 a major flood control effort was
two-thirds complete when the court granted injunctive relief pending an
environmental impact statement. The court noted that annual spring
flooding caused widespread destruction of life and property. Later in the
opinion the court discussed more extensively the claim advanced by
the plaintiffs that the project would change one of the few remaining
locations for stream fishing into a more common flat water fishing site.
Individuals and local citizens groups who sue under NEPA are not
always as public-spirited in their motives as conservationists and courts
may subject their claims to closer scrutiny. In Nucleus of Chicago
Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn,139 a coalition of community organizations
and individuals claimed that a proposed low income, federally subsidized
housing would significantly affect the quality of the environment so as to
require the Department of Housing and Urban Development to file an
EIS. The plaintiffs argued that, as a class, tenants of low income housing
have a high propensity for anti-social behavior and that their presence
would have a deleterious effect on the neighborhood. 140 The court held
335 Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 12 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
u3 Id. at 12. See also Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1334-35 (S.D. Tex.
1973). But ci. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463, 468
(2d Cir. 1971); EDF v. Corps, 492 F.2d 1123, 1130 (5th Cir. 1974).
137 See Murphy, supra note 32, at 993.
18 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
MS9 372 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
140 [TJhe plaintiffs allege that they are members of the "middle class and/or work-
ing class" which emphasizes obedience and respect for lawful authority, has a
much lower propensity toward criminal behavior and acts of physical violence,
and possesses a high regard for the physical and aesthetic improvement of real
and personal property. The plaintiffs further allege that "as a statistical whole"
tenants of public housing possess a higher propensity toward criminal behavior
and acts of violence, a disregard for the physical and aesthetic maintenance of
real and personal property, and a lower commitment to hard work. Therefore,
so the plaintiffs insist, the construction of public housing will increase the
hazards of criminal acts, physical violence, and an aesthetic and economic
decline in the immediate vicinity of the sites. The plaintiffs maintain that these
factors will have a direct adverse impact upon the physical safety of the
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that the evidence did not support the proposition that prospective tenants
would significantly affect the environment. In its opinion, the court
noted that, "[e]nvironmental impact in the meaning of the Act cannot
be reasonably construed to include a class of persons per se."'' The
relevant inquiry is whether actions resulting from the economic and
social characteristics will affect the environment and, on that issue,
plaintiffs' sociological predictions were not persuasive. 42
The legislative history of NEPA does not resolve the issue of whether
social impacts of particular groups of people are within the scope of the
statute. Undesirable land use patterns and urban congestion are among
the concerns of NEPA. 4 3 The primary and, arguably, exclusive focus
of the Act is ecological, not sociological. Senator Jackson stated that the
policy of the bill is to strive "to achieve a standard of excellence in man's
relationship to his physical surroundings." 14
Industrial plaintiffs have begun to rely on NEPA to protect their
economic interests. The threshold problem in these cases is standing. A
corporation's competitive position is not within the ambit of NEPA
protection. If a business enterprise establishes that there is a public
interest as well, courts generally allow the case to go forward on the
merits even when it is clear that the pecuniary motive dominates.
National Helium Corp. v. Morton14 involved the cancellation of
purchase contracts for helium by the Department of Interior. Although
government contractors have standing to sue, the court also recognized
National Helium Corporation as a private attorney general for purposes
of the NEPA claims. The interests of the business coincided with the
public interest in possible irreparable harm resulting from the escape
of helium into the atmosphere.
In Chemical Leaman Tank Lines v. United States,1 a trucking
company challenged an Interstate Commerce Commission regulation
which eased licensing proceedings for carriers of recyclable material
which was currently being discarded. Despite both the plaintiff's economic
motive and the ICC's pro-environmental aim, the district court permitted
plaintiffs residing in close proximity to the sites, together with a direct adverse
impact upon the aesthetic and economic quality of their lives.
372 F. Supp. at 148.
141 372 F. Supp. at 149.
142 Accord, Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 833 (2d Cir. 1971): "It is doubtful
whether psychological and sociological effects upon neighbors constitute the type of
factors that may be considered in making such a determination since they do not lend
themselves to measurement."
14 115 CoNo. REc. 40417 (1969).
144 Id. at 40416.
145 361 F. Supp. 78 (D. Kan. 1971), rev'd, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 995 (1974).
146 343 F. Supp. 1269 (D. DeL 1973).
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standing. The industry and the public shared a stake in evaluating
the potential environmental drawbacks of higher levels of pollution,
highway congestion and depletion of the national fuel supply which
might result from increased truck traffic.
In a more restrictive holding on standing, the District Court of
Maryland dismissed a suit by a hospital seeking to bar approval of the
construction of another hospital in the immediate vicinity, concluding
that a plaintiff corporation "cannot assert an injury to its aesthetic
enjoyment of the environment."'147
The last identifiable group of NEPA plaintiffs is that of state and
local governmental units. Recognizing the traditional dominance of these
bodies in land use areas, the Act sought to make them an integral part
of decision making in the NEPA scheme. 148 Several of them have pursued
the interests of their citizens through the administrative process into the
courts. 49 In City of New York v. United States, 5° the city sought to annul
an ICC order allowing abandonment of a Brooklyn railroad line. They
successfully argued that the action required an impact study of the
economic and physical deterioration that would occur in the local
community as a result of the loss of jobs and loss of business for
the railroad users, suppliers and customers. In Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. FPC,'5' New York intervened to argue that the EIS
prepared for a proposed power plant did not adequately assess the
danger to a nearby aqueduct that is a major source of the city's water
supply. These aims are more consistent with NEPA goals.
NEPA set very ambitious procedural and substantive goals for
itself. It is not clear that it will succeed in accomplishing them. However,
if parties exploit the Act as a vehicle for obtaining judicial review of
all government actions with which they are dissatisfied for any reason,
they will overburden it and obscure its primary aims. Because of the
broad language of the Act and a general sympathy with its philosophy,
courts have been hesitant to restrict its application. The bulk of litigation
and the varieties of relief sought suggest a problem that looks far beyond
NEPA to the need for a more open and responsive administrative process
that allows greater opportunities for the expression of local and individual
preferences in every sphere of government activity.
147 Clinton Community Hosp. Corp. v. Southern Maryland Medical Center, 374 F.
Supp. 450, 456 (D. Md. 1974).
148 NEPA § 4332(2) (C), (F).
149 See Montgomery County v. Richardson, 340 F. Supp. 591 (D.D.C. 1972); Dela-
ware v. Pennsylvania New York Central Transportation Co., 323 F. Supp. 487 (D.
Del. 1971).
150 337 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
151 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971).
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CONCLUSION
As indicated throughout this paper, the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 has distinct procedural and substantive goals. The
procedural aims, as courts have interpreted them, are quite specific and
strictly enforceable. The substantive goals,'15 on the other hand, are
ambitious sounding but vague and not readily susceptible of enforcement.
If we are interested principally in absolute qualitative improvement in
our physical surroundings, NEPA is not the most appropriate solution.
The environmental impact statement process is a cumbersome
procedural machine and there is little to suggest that it is producing drastic
changes in agency programs and attitudes. The Council on Environmental
Quality in its Fourth Annual Report listed a number of projects that
agencies have abandoned as a result of NEPA studies.1 0 That they were
able to list them may be the best indication that such abandonment is the
rare exception. There are numerous litigated cases, as well, in which
project review goes up and down through the courts at various stages
in the EIS process, perhaps as many as three or four times over
several years. In the end, the court finds that the agency has not
been guilty of an abuse of discretion in its approval of the project
in substantially the same form as originally planned.54
The mere requirement of evaluating environmental impact may
have some beneficial side effects that are difficult to detect from outside
an agency. In fulfilling the rituals of preparing an EIS, enumerating
alternatives and reviewing suggestions of ways to minimize adverse
effects, agencies may be discovering and adopting modifications of their
projects. However, there is no positive evidence of this.
Minimum quality standards, nondegradation regulations and absolute
prohibition of certain harmful substances and activities are more direct
152As indicated in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1651
et seq. (1973).
3 4 COUNCIL ON ENVmONMENTAL QuALrrY ANN. RFp. 246-47 (1973).
154 See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.
1972), af'd, 468 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1972), 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973),
aff'd, 492, F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1974).
The Storm King hydroelectric plant has been in litigation since 1965. Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied
sub nom., Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference, 348 U.S. 941 (1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,
453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 926 (1972); Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FPC, 499 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1974). The Hudson River
Fisherman's Association (HRFA) has become the plaintiff's successor in interest and
the litigation continues. Hudson River Fisherman's Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d 827 (2d
Cir. 1974). The NEPA claims were added in 1971. Currently, the FPC is conducting
further hearings on the potential harm to fish. New York Times, Nov. 12, 1974, at
35, col. 7. There is no indication that Consolidated Edison has made any significant
alterations in its original plans.
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methods for achieving an improved environment. 55 They set out much
clearer standards than NEPA and limit the range of discretion of
recalcitrant agencies. However, they are not without their flaws.5 6 They
may involve unwarranted assumptions about the state of knowledge of
pollutants and environmental impacts. 57 Because of their concreteness,
they tend to stifle the kind of research and case-by-case analyses that
agencies should be conducting under NEPA. But the primary drawback
in the absolute standard approach is that it fails to recognize that difficult
environmental questions involve serious competition among important
conflicting values. A single, inflexible rule cannot answer those questions.
Congress did not establish the protection of our natural habitat as
our foremost national priority. Only an environmental crisis of much
greater proportions than the one we -face now could provoke that
determination. It is premature to abandon it and yet no radical reforms
present themselves either. Many have suggested a veto power for the CEQ.
That assumes that CEQ can acquire an adequate understanding of agency
processes and goals to make a responsible judgment about when a veto
is appropriate. It may also represent an over-valuation of our concern
for the environment. We generally do not accord any single agency
the weight a veto power entails.
The present structure of NEPA is ideal for according the environment
the attention it deserves. What is lacking are incentives for enforcement
within the agencies. It is necessary to create for agencies the same vested
interest in the environment as they have in their main field of concern.
Earmarking agency funds to be used only for NEPA-related purposes,
making special environmental study grants available for major programs
and providing separate funding for environmental staffing might help
to create that vested interest. These suggestions require a reaffirmation by
Congress-in the form of additional appropriations-that they still believe
in the goals they set out in NEPA.
Theoretically, EIS procedures are suited to encouraging rational
balancing and that, in itself, seems like a minimal burden to impose
on agencies. But NEPA is not working in several important respects
as this paper has illustrated. Congress should reevaluate NEPA and
determine national priorities.
MARY ANNE SULLIVAN
Yale Law School
155 Cf. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1955); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1151 et seq. (1966).
1W See generally Note, The Nondegradation Controversy: How Clean Will Our Air Be?
1974 UNIV. ILL. L. FORUM 314 (1974).
157 Greenburg & Hordon, Environmental Impact Statements: Some Annoying Ques-
tions, 40 J. AM. INST. PLAN. 164 (May 1974).
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